Post-quantum cryptography: replace the encryption a quantum computer could break.

The public-key encryption that protects your sign-ins, connections and signed files was designed to resist classical computers, not quantum ones. We help you find where it is used, decide what to protect first, and move to the post-quantum standards in phases, without breaking the systems that depend on it.

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What we cover

The riskWhy the threat matters before the quantum computer exists
The standardsThe new algorithms are published
How we workInventory, prioritize, then migrate in phases
Where it appliesWhere post-quantum work usually starts

The risk

Why the threat matters before the quantum computer exists

Most secure connections and digital signatures rely on RSA or elliptic-curve cryptography. A large, error-corrected quantum computer running Shor's algorithm could break both. That machine does not exist yet, but two things make the risk current.

First, an attacker can record encrypted traffic or copy encrypted files now and decrypt them later, an approach often called harvest now, decrypt later. Anything that must stay confidential for many years, such as health records, financial data, legal files and government information, is already exposed.

Second, changing cryptography across an organization is slow. It lives in operating systems, web servers, VPNs, databases, identity platforms, code signing, hardware and every vendor product you buy. Earlier migrations, such as retiring old hash algorithms and protocol versions, took many organizations years.

The standards

The new algorithms are published

In 2024 the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published its first post-quantum standards: ML-KEM for establishing keys (FIPS 203), and ML-DSA and SLH-DSA for digital signatures (FIPS 204 and FIPS 205). They run on ordinary computers and are already appearing in browsers, operating systems, cloud services and cryptographic libraries.

Many early deployments use a hybrid mode that combines a classical algorithm with a post-quantum one, so a connection stays secure as long as either holds. NIST's transition guidance and the NSA's CNSA 2.0 for national security systems set out timelines for retiring today's public-key algorithms, and regulated organizations can expect auditors and customers to ask how far along they are.

How we work

Inventory, prioritize, then migrate in phases

We start by finding where cryptography is used, which is harder than it sounds. We combine scans of certificates, TLS endpoints and key stores with a review of your applications, identity platforms and vendor products, and record each use in a cryptographic inventory: which algorithm, protecting what data, for how long, and who owns it.

From the inventory we rank what to fix first, weighing how long the data must stay secret against how hard the system is to change. Then we plan the migration in phases: update the libraries and platforms that already support the new algorithms, ask vendors for their roadmaps, and test hybrid configurations in a copy of your environment before they reach production.

The aim throughout is crypto-agility: systems built so that the next change of algorithm is a configuration update rather than a rewrite.

What we do

A cryptographic inventory of certificates, protocols, keys and libraries
Risk ranking by data lifetime and difficulty of change
Vendor readiness questions and tracking
Hybrid post-quantum testing before production
Crypto-agility guidance for new applications

Where it applies

Where post-quantum work usually starts

The first places to look are usually external connections such as websites, APIs, VPNs and remote access; identity and single sign-on; long-lived signed artifacts such as code, firmware and documents; and archives of sensitive data that are kept for years. Microsoft, cloud and network platforms are adding post-quantum support release by release, so part of the work is simply knowing when each of yours is ready and switching it on deliberately, with a test and a way back.

Questions

Common questions

Do we need to replace all of our encryption?

No. The main risk is to public-key algorithms such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography, which handle key exchange and signatures. Symmetric encryption such as AES with 256-bit keys is considered resistant to known quantum attacks. The work is finding and replacing the public-key parts, which are spread widely.

Is it too early to start?

Not for the inventory and the plan. The standards are published, vendors are shipping support, and the inventory is useful on its own for managing certificates and retiring old protocols. Changes to production systems can follow vendor readiness, one phase at a time.

Will post-quantum algorithms slow our systems down?

Some of the new keys and signatures are larger than today's, which can matter for constrained devices and very high volumes of connections. For most web and enterprise traffic the difference is small, but we test on your systems before recommending a change.

Can you certify that we are quantum-safe?

No one can honestly certify that today. What we can do is show you where your exposure is, reduce it in a planned order, and document the work so your auditors and customers can see the progress.

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